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Anek Laothamatas. Business Associations
and the New Political Economy of Thailand:
From Bureaucratic Polity to Liberal Corporatism.
Boulder: Westview Press and Singapore: Insti-
tute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992, 202 p.
The author's central thesis is that Thailand is no
longer a bureaucratic polity. His reasoning is that
"organized business has formed politically effective
extra-bureaucratic groups and the policy of the gov-
ernment is no longer determined solely by the
bureaucratic elite" (p. 14). In this, he disagrees with
such political scientists in Chulalongkom University as
Chaianan, Sukhumbhand, and Suchit, who argue that
Thailand is still essentially a bureaucratic polity (for
reference, see p. 17). (The author is with the Fac-
ulty of Political Science at Thammasat University.)
Not being a political scientist, I am not in a position
to judge whether he is right. or not, but, as an
economist, I was interested in his argument that
"Through political and economic collective work ... ,
these [business] organizations have urged and facili-
tated the shift of the national economic strategy to an
export-oriented one" (p. 14).
Thailand's export-oriented strategy started with
the Third National Economic and Social Development
Plan (1972-1976), but the big shift towards this
strategy came in the early 1980s. How this came
about had not been well documented until this book
was published. On pages 76-87, the author explains
how the Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative
Committee (JPPCC) came to be formed. This ex-
planation can be also taken as the basic explanation of
how government policy came to be export-oriented,
for the major reason for setting up the JPPCC was to
create a positive environment for export promotion.
One interesting discussion in this connection is the
rise of the Sino-Thai business class. Unlike the hey-
day of bureaucratic politics in the 1950s, when there
was a disjunction of wealth and power (the govern-
ment under the indigenous Thai and the economy
under the Chinese), by the early 1970s the economy
had come to be dominated by the Sino-Thai, second-
and third-generation Chinese with Thai citizenship and
education (p. 77). At the same time, the Thai civil
bureaucracy had been taking in the Sino-Thai, and
many of them had risen to high government positions.
And the flow was not one way: the children of
bureaucrats entered the ranks of business executives,
accounting for one-fifth of the business elite in the late
1970s. As a result of these developments, the gov-
ernment became more willing to listen to the business
sector, while the latter became able to approach the
government with confidence.
The author discusses specific cases, among which
the most interesting to me are those of the gem and
jewelry industry (pp. 97-98) and the tourist industry
(p. 127), which became major foreign exchange earn-
ers in the 1980s. The author does not focus on
textiles, which became the first export-oriented
manufacturing industry and remained the major ex-
port industry until recently, when it was replaced by
the electronic and electrical machinery industry. If
he had done so, I wonder how his findings would have
fitted into his overall discussion. Government-
business cooperation in this case dates back to the
early 1970s, when the industry faced excessive
capacity and had to export part of its output. The
sharp increase of textile exports was the result of the
slow, but steady administrative changes which had
been going on as the result of consultation between
the government and business in the 1970s.
One industry in which the government was very
much autonomous in policy formulation was finance.
The author discusses this on pp. 140-141. The ma-
jor supervising agency, the Bank of Thailand, consults
with individual companies or their associations (the
Thai Bankers Association in particular), but its policy
has never been dictated by them. This is the indus-
try at the core of the modem credit system, and the
government of a developing country is usually unwill-
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ing to leave its development to the slow, sometimes
chaotic process of market forces (as is done in West-
ern Europe) but wants to get directly involved in
supervising and nurturing it. The relatively smooth
development of modem credit institutions in Thailand
(such as banks, finance companies, the stock market)
can be attributed partly to the effective guidance of
the Bank of Thailand (which is now sponsoring the
creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission
to replace the present regulating arrangements for
the Stock Exchange of Thailand). Among govern-
ment agencies, the Bank of Thailand holds a unique
place: well before the 1980s, it had been corruption-
free and efficient, unlike other government agencies.
Thailand cannot be characterized as a strong state,
like such NICs as Singapore and South Korea, as the
author correctly points out (p. 170). If Thai develop-
ment is considered to have been relatively successful,
what should be the relation between the government
and the business sector in other developing coun-
tries? The author argues that until it can strengthen
its state structure, its development "will be better
served by a society-oriented approach which encour-
ages an active participation of societal actors in eco-
nomic policy-making" (p. 170). The trouble with this
argument is that, for a developing country, Thailand
has a fairly strong government. This may not be so
compared with Korea or Singapore, either today or
when their per capital incomes were similar to that of
Thailand today, but compared with other ASEAN
countries, Thailand's bureaucracy is impressively
strong. This is related to the fact that the country
has been largely an authoritarian state (first under
absolute monarchy and then under the military).
Into such a strong state structure, businesses have
been incorporated at a pace virtually dictated by the
bureaucratic elites. When the state structure is
weak, as in the case of the Philippines, business
interests capture the government, and changes in
government policy (such as a shift to export-oriented
policy) become difficult since they threaten those with
vested interests in current policy. The ability of the
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Thai government to shift to export-oriented strategy
is not unrelated to its ability to provide infrastructure
and general administrative services (which econo-
mists call public goods). The author does not ignore
the problem of government, but because of his focus
on business associations, the government's relative
strength and autonomy do not emerge clearly in this
book.
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